Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access and Self-Assessed Health After 3 Years by Courtemanche, Charles J. et al.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Economics Faculty Publications Economics 
9-6-2018 
Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access and 
Self-Assessed Health After 3 Years 
Charles J. Courtemanche 
University of Kentucky, courtemanche@uky.edu 
James Marton 
Georgia State University 
Benjamin Ukert 
University of Pennsylvania 
Aaron Yelowitz 
University of Kentucky, aaron.yelowitz@uky.edu 
Daniela Zapata 
IMPAQ International, LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_facpub 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons, Health Services Administration Commons, Health Services 
Research Commons, and the Statistics and Probability Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Repository Citation 
Courtemanche, Charles J.; Marton, James; Ukert, Benjamin; Yelowitz, Aaron; and Zapata, Daniela, "Effects 
of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access and Self-Assessed Health After 3 Years" (2018). 
Economics Faculty Publications. 3. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_facpub/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, 
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access and Self-Assessed Health 
After 3 Years 
Notes/Citation Information 
Published in INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing, v. 55, p. 1-10. 
© The Author(s) 2018 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 
License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, 
reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is 
attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-
access-at-sage). 
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0046958018796361 
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_facpub/3 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0046958018796361
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial 
use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and 
Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care
Organization, Provision, and Financing
Volume 55: 1 –10
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions 
DOI: 10.1 77/004695801879636
journals.sagepub.com/home/inq
Introduction
The primary components of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
including the individual mandate, subsidized Marketplace 
coverage, and state Medicaid expansions, were implemented 
in 2014.1 A growing literature has emerged evaluating how 
state-specific insurance coverage,2-10 access to care,11-13 and 
self-assessed health14-19 changed following the law’s imple-
mentation. Studies aiming to identify causal effects of the 
ACA using nationwide data tend to find that it increased 
insurance coverage and access to care after 1 (2014) or 2 
(2014-2015) postreform years, but did not have as clear an 
effect on self-assessed health.15-18 These findings are perhaps 
surprising given that other recent coverage expansions have 
translated into gains in self-assessed health over a relatively 
short time period, including the 2006 Massachusetts health 
care reform20,21 and the 2008 Oregon Medicaid lottery.22,23
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Abstract
Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, we examine the causal impact of the Affordable Care Act 
on health-related outcomes after 3 years. We estimate difference-in-difference-in-differences models that exploit variation 
in treatment intensity from 2 sources: (1) local area prereform uninsured rates from 2013 and (2) state participation in the 
Medicaid expansion. Including the third postreform year leads to 2 important insights. First, gains in health insurance coverage 
and access to care from the policy continued to increase in the third year. Second, an improvement in the probability of 
reporting excellent health emerged in the third year, with the effect being largely driven by the non-Medicaid expansions 
components of the policy.
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What do we already know about this topic?
While the Affordable Care Act (ACA) increased insurance coverage and access to care after 1 (2014) or 2 (2014-2015) 
postreform years, the existing causally interpretable evidence suggests that effects on self-assessed health outcomes 
were not as clear after 2 years.
How does your research contribute to the field?
The purpose of this article is to revisit the causal impact of the ACA on health insurance coverage, access to care, and 
self-assessed health using newly released calendar year 2016 data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
What are your research’s implications toward theory, practice, or policy?
We find that gains in health insurance coverage and access to care from the policy continued to increase, while an 
improvement in the probability of reporting excellent health emerged in the third year, with the effect being largely 
driven by the non-Medicaid expansions components of the policy.
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The purpose of this article is to revisit the causal effects of 
the ACA on health insurance coverage, access to care, and 
self-assessed health using newly released calendar year 2016 
data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first article 
to examine causal impacts on these outcomes using a national 
sample and 3 years of postreform data (2014-2016). There are 
multiple reasons why the addition of a third year is important. 
First, it may take time for the newly insured to get acclimated 
with their new coverage and how to use it effectively. The 
duration of this adjustment period could be impacted by fac-
tors on the demand-side of the market, as one article suggests 
that only 12% of adults have proficient health literacy,24 or 
factors on the supply-side, such as the issues associated with 
the rollout of the Marketplace.25 Second, economists generally 
model health as a capital stock that changes gradually in 
response to changes in health-related investments.26 Even if 
changes in health care utilization occurred quickly, several 
years may pass before the resulting health gains become suf-
ficiently large to be statistically detectable. Rapid improve-
ments in self-assessed health reported in other contexts could 
plausibly be the result of a “warm glow” associated with gain-
ing public or subsidized private coverage rather than genuine 
improvements in health.21,22 In other words, some individuals 
may report better health simply because of an overall feeling 
of happiness from receiving a valuable product. Such a “warm 
glow” may not have occurred with the ACA because of its low 
popularity (36% of adults making under $40 000 reported 
viewing the ACA favorably in January 2014) relative to the 
Massachusetts and Oregon expansions.27
Following recent articles seeking to estimate the impact 
of the full ACA, we estimate difference-in-difference-in-dif-
ferences (DDD) models with the differences coming from 
time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pre-
treatment uninsured rate.7,18,28 Studies that focus only on the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion typically use a simpler differ-
ence-in-differences (DD) model that compares changes in 
Medicaid expansion states to changes in nonexpansion 
states. However, identifying the impact of the other compo-
nents of the ACA, such as the individual mandate and subsi-
dized Marketplace coverage, is more challenging because 
they were implemented in every state simultaneously. Our 
third difference addresses this challenge by exploiting the 
fact that the national components of the ACA should provide 
the most intense “treatment” in areas with the highest prere-
form uninsured rates. This is in the spirit of studies evaluat-
ing the introduction of Medicare and the Massachusetts 
health insurance reform.29,30
Our data set consists of nonelderly adults included in the 
2011-2016 waves of the BRFSS. The BRFSS is a commonly 
used data source in the ACA literature because it includes a 
number of questions related to health care access and self-
assessed health. In addition, it is large enough to precisely 
estimate the effects of state policy interventions, with over 
300 000 observations per year.
We find that the ACA substantially improved access to 
care among nonelderly adults. Relative to 2013, insurance 
coverage in Medicaid expansion states increased by 6.5 per-
centage points in 2014, 9.7 percentage points in 2015, and 
11.8 percentage points in 2016. In states that did not expand 
Medicaid, gains in insurance coverage were 3.6 percentage 
points in 2014, 5.9 percentage points in 2015, and 8.3 per-
centage points in 2016. We also find that the ACA reduced 
reports of costs being a barrier to seeking care and increased 
the likelihood of having a primary care doctor, with the 
effects again growing over time. The gains in these outcomes 
are only modestly larger in Medicaid expansion states than in 
nonexpansion states, implying that they are mostly attribut-
able to the nationwide components of the ACA.
With respect to self-assessed health, we find that the ACA 
increased the probability of reporting excellent health and 
reduced days in poor mental health. In contrast, a recent arti-
cle with only 2 posttreatment years found no evidence of 
gains in these outcomes despite also using BRFSS data and 
the same identification strategy.18 The emergence of an impact 
on the probability of having excellent self-assessed health 
appears particularly gradual, as the effect of the full ACA was 
small and insignificant in 2014, 1.9 percentage points in 2015, 
and 2.7 percentage points in 2016. Improvements in self-
assessed health at lower points of the distribution also emerge 
in 2016. Most of these gains appear to come from the non-
Medicaid-expansion components of the law.
Data and Methods
Data
We use data from the BRFSS, an annual telephone survey 
organized by state health departments and the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. The survey collects infor-
mation on various aspects of health care access and health 
for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Having a large 
sample size is important for our study because the ACA 
affected health insurance coverage for only a fraction of the 
population, limiting plausible effect sizes. The BRFSS is the 
largest continuous health survey in the United States, collect-
ing information on more than 300 000 adults per year.
We conduct our analysis using information from individu-
als 19 to 64 years old who were interviewed between 2011 
and 2016. Individuals older than 64 years were excluded 
because the ACA was not intended to affect their health care 
coverage. Our sample starts in 2011 because this is the first 
year in which the BRFSS included cell phones in its sam-
pling frame. A 2011-2016 sample period gives us 3 years of 
pretreatment data and 3 years of posttreatment data.
We utilize 9 outcome variables. The first 3 relate to access 
to care: indicators for any health insurance coverage, having 
a primary care doctor, and having any care needed but fore-
gone because of cost in the past 12 months. The remaining 
outcomes relate to self-assessed health status. These include 
Courtemanche et al 3
dummy variables for whether overall health is good or better 
(ie good, very good, or excellent), very good or excellent, 
and excellent, as well as days of the last 30 not in good men-
tal health, not in good physical health, and with health-related 
functional limitations. Subjective self-assessed health vari-
ables such as these have been shown to be correlated with 
objective measures of health, including mortality.31-33
The regressions include controls for demographic charac-
teristics, household characteristics, economic characteristics, 
and measures that capture state differences in the implementa-
tion of the ACA. More specifically, we use BRFSS informa-
tion to construct dummy variables for age groups (5-year 
increments from 25-29 to 60-64, with 19-24 as the reference 
group), gender (female), race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic black, 
Hispanic, and other, with non-Hispanic white as the reference 
group), marital status (married), education (high school 
degree, some college, and college graduate, with less than a 
high school degree as the reference group), household income 
($10 000-$15 000, $15 000-$20 000, $20 000-$25 000, $25 
000-$35 000, $35 000-$50 000, $50 000-$75 000, and >$75 
000, with <$10 000 as the reference group), number of chil-
dren in the household (separate indicators for 0 to 4, with 5 or 
more as the reference group), whether the respondent reports a 
primary occupation of student, and whether the respondent is 
unemployed. In addition, we use information from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics to control for seasonally adjusted monthly 
state unemployment rate. Finally, we include dummy vari-
ables for whether states set up their own insurance exchanges 
and whether these exchanges experienced glitches.34,35
One of our treatment variables, which measures the “dose” 
of the ACA’s impact, is the uninsured rate in the respondent’s 
“local area” in the pretreatment year of 2013. We compute 
each respondent’s “local area” pretreatment uninsured rate 
within our BRFSS sample. The BRFSS provides information 
regarding whether the respondent resides in the center city of 
a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), outside the center city 
of a MSA but inside the county containing the center city, 
inside a suburban county of the MSA, or not in a MSA. The 
survey did not collect location information from cell phone 
respondents. We use this “local area” variable to construct 4 
subgroups within each state: those living within a central city, 
suburbs, non-MSA, and location within the state unavailable 
(this is the case for respondents interviewed on cell phones). 
Based on these 4 within-state categories, we calculate the pre-
treatment average uninsured rates by location (considering 
“cell phone” to be a location for the sake of convenience) 
within a state.18 To ensure that each area contains enough 
respondents to reliably compute pretreatment uninsured rates, 
we combine the 7 areas with fewer than 200 respondents in 
2013 with other larger areas. Specifically, we combine the 
central city and suburban parts of Wyoming into one area, and 
do the same for the states Vermont, South Dakota, and 
Montana. In addition, we combine the suburban and rural 
parts of Massachusetts, Arizona, and California. Ultimately, 
we have 194 areas with 2013 uninsured rates that are 
computed from 219 to 5804 respondents, with the average 
being 1475 respondents and the median being 1205.
Our Medicaid expansion variable is based on information 
collected by the Kaiser Family Foundation.34 A total of 32 
states expanded Medicaid by 2016. The majority of states 
expanded Medicaid in January 2014, with some exceptions. 
Michigan’s expansion took effect in April 2014 and New 
Hampshire’s in August 2014. Pennsylvania, Indiana, and 
Alaska expanded Medicaid in January, February, and 
September of 2015, respectively. Montana and Louisiana 
expanded Medicaid in January and July of 2016, respectively. 
States are classified as part of the Medicaid expansion treat-
ment group beginning the month/year of their expansion.
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard devia-
tions of the dependent variables, stratified into 4 groups based 
on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid and 
whether her local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate was above 
or below the median within the sample. According to Table 1, 
79% of the sample had insurance at baseline. Individuals in 
Medicaid expansion states were slightly more likely to have 
insurance prior to 2014 than those in nonexpansion states 
(regardless of baseline uninsurance rate levels). Residents who 
live in Medicaid expansion states with prereform uninsured 
rates below the median (column 3) had, on average, better 
health care access and self-assessed health than the rest of the 
sample even before the ACA was implemented. Our economet-
ric design will account for these baseline differences. Our 
online appendix describes trends in our outcome variables over 
time as well as summary statistics for the control variables.
Data Analysis
Our goal is to estimate the 2014-2016 effects of both the fully 
implemented ACA (including the Medicaid expansion) and the 
ACA without the Medicaid expansion for each one of the out-
comes of interest. The major challenge we face is in disentan-
gling the impacts of the nationwide components of the ACA 
(eg, subsidized Marketplace coverage and the individual man-
dates) from underlying year-to-year fluctuations that would 
have occurred even in the ACA’s absence. To address this chal-
lenge, we adopt a DDD strategy used by 3 recent articles that 
estimate the ACA’s effects on health insurance coverage after 1 
year and access to care, health, and ambulance response times 
after 2 years.7,18,28 This approach differs from the DD linear 
regression strategy that has been used to compare Medicaid 
expansion to nonexpansion states before and after the ACA’s 
implementation by adding a third “difference.”
This third source of variation comes from differences in 
area pretreatment (2013) uninsured rates, which allows for 
the inclusion of time period fixed effects while still identi-
fying the effect of the national components of the ACA.30 
Intuitively, we would expect to see larger responses to the 
national components of the ACA in areas with higher 2013 
uninsured rates as a greater share of their residents could 
be affected. Combining this with a separate treatment from 
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the Medicaid expansion implies that the intensity of treat-
ment (size of the coverage expansion) was strongest in 
high pre-ACA uninsured rate areas in states that expanded 
Medicaid.
Formally, the DDD linear regression model, which com-
bines 2014, 2015, and 2016 into a single postreform period, 
is given by Equation 1:
  
y UNINSURED POST
MEDICAID POST
UNIN
iast as t
st t
= + ×( ) +
× +
γ γ
γ
γ
0 1
2
3
( )
SURED MEDICAID POSTas s t
at as iast
× ×( ) +
+ + +γ θ α ε4Xiast ,
 (1)
where
•• yiast  is the outcome for individual i in area type (cen-
tral city, rest of MSA, non-MSA, cell phone) a in state 
s in month/year t,
•• POSTt  indicates whether period t is in the postreform 
period of January 2014 or later,
•• Xiast  is a vector of control variables,
•• MEDICAIDs  indicates whether state s participated in 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion,
•• UNINSUREDas  is the 2013 (pre-reform) uninsured 
rate in area type a within state s,
•• θat  denotes fixed effects for each time-by-area-type 
combination (eg, non-MSA in March 2012); these 
control for time as flexibly as possible and also allow 
time trends to evolve differentially across individuals 
living in the 4 different area types,
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by State Medicaid Expansion Status and Pretreatment Uninsured Rate.
Full sample
Medicaid expansion; 
⩾ median baseline 
uninsured
Medicaid expansion; 
< median baseline 
uninsured
Nonexpansion; ⩾ 
median baseline 
uninsured
Nonexpansion; < 
median baseline 
uninsured
Any insurance coverage 0.788
(0.409)
0.772
(0.419)
0.886
(0.318)
0.684
(0.464)
0.831
(0.375)
Primary care doctor 0.741
(0.439)
0.722
(0.448)
0.850
(0.357)
0.634
(0.482)
0.811
(0.392)
Cost barrier to care in past year 0.192
(0.394)
0.218
(0.412)
0.130
(0.336)
0.256
(0.436)
0.171
(0.376)
Overall health good or better 0.840
(0.367)
0.815
(0.388)
0.854
(0.353)
0.826
(0.379)
0.843
(0.363)
Overall health very good or better 0.536
(0.499)
0.513
(0.499)
0.571
(0.494)
0.505
(0.499)
0.545
(0.498)
Overall health excellent 0.204
(0.403)
0.189
(0.392)
0.213
(0.409)
0.200
(0.400)
0.199
(0.399)
Days not in good physical health in 
past month
3.648
(7.964)
4.282
(8.660)
3.727
(8.114)
4.247
(8.432)
3.789
(8.231)
Days not in good mental health in 
past month
4.108
(8.210)
4.663
(8.745)
3.805
(7.955)
3.630
(7.992)
3.882
(8.130)
Days with health-related limitations 
in past month
2.508
(6.779)
2.963
(7.367)
2.524
(6.854)
2.572
(6.463)
2.572
(6.999)
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.
•• αas  denotes fixed effects for each area (eg, central 
city in Georgia),
•• and εiast  is the error term, which is heteroscedastic-
ity-robust and clustered by state.
Note that POSTt  is not separately included in Equation 1 
since it is absorbed by the time fixed effects ( θat ), while the 
terms UNINSUREDas , MEDICAIDs , and 
UNINSURED MEDICAIDas s×  are not separately included 
since they are absorbed by the area fixed effects ( )αas . 
Finally, BRFSS sampling weights are used to account for the 
complex survey design.
The effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is 
given by γ1  × UNINSUREDas , which means it is assumed to 
be 0 in a (hypothetical) area with a 0 percent uninsured rate at 
baseline and to increase linearly as the prereform uninsured rate 
rises. The effect of the Medicaid expansion alone is given by 
γ3 × ×UNINSURED MEDICAIDas s , meaning it is 0 in nonex-
pansion states (where MEDICAIDs = 0 ) and 
γ3 ×UNINSUREDas  in expansion states (where 
MEDICAIDs =1 ). As the Medicaid expansion should not caus-
ally affect coverage in an area with a 0 percent baseline unin-
sured rate, we consider γ2  to represent unobserved confounders 
rather than capturing part of the expansion’s causal effect.7,30 The 
effect of the “full” ACA, ie, in Medicaid expansion states, com-
bines the impacts of the Medicaid and non-Medicaid compo-
nents: γ1× UNINSURED UNINSUREDas as+ ×γ3 . In the 
tables, we report the predicted effect of the ACA at the sample 
mean pretreatment uninsured rate. This is given by γ1× 
UNINSUREDas  in nonexpansion states and γ1× 
UNINSURED UNINSUREDas as+ ×γ3  in expansion states.
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In addition to average effects over the 2014-2016 time 
period, we are also interested in how the effects varied over 
time across these 3 years. To analyze changes over time, we 
estimate event-study models where we replace the before vs 
after 2014 time indicator in our DDD model with a set of 
individual year dummies. These models help to highlight the 
contribution associated with the inclusion of calendar year 
2016 data. The event-study DDD model we estimate is for-
mally given by Equation 2.
     
y UNINSURED Y
MEDICAID Y
iast
t
T
t as t
t
T
t s t
t
T
= + ×( ) +
× +
=
=
=
∑
∑
ϕ θ
α
1
1
1
( )
∑ × ×( ) +
+ +
β
δ α ε
t as s t
iast as iast
UNINSURED MEDICAID Y
X ,
 (2)
where Y
t
 is an indicator for whether year t is 2011, 2012, 2014, 
2015, or 2016, respectively, for t = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, and the other 
terms are as described in Equation 1. Here the effects of the 
ACA without the Medicaid expansion during 2014, 2015, and 
2016 are given by θ θ3 4× ×UNINSURED UNINSUREDas as, , 
and θ5 ×UNINSUREDas , respectively, while the effects of the 
Medicaid expansion in 2014, 2015, and 2016 are similarly 
given by β β3 4× ×UNINSURED UNINSUREDas as, ,  and 
β5 ×UNINSUREDas .
Another advantage of the event-study model is that it 
allows us to test the identifying assumptions from our main 
DDD specification.7,18 The first assumption is that, in the 
absence of the ACA, any changes in the outcomes that would 
have occurred in 2014-2016 would not have been systemati-
cally correlated with area uninsured rates, conditional on the 
controls. The second assumption is that, without the ACA, 
differential changes in the outcomes in 2014-2016 between 
Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states would not have 
been correlated with prereform uninsured rates. While such 
counterfactuals cannot be directly observed, they can be pre-
dicted based on pretreatment trends. If the event-study model 
finds evidence that changes in the outcomes from 2011-2013 
are correlated with area uninsured rate (ie, θ1  or θ2  are sig-
nificant), this would suggest that the first assumption is 
likely violated. Similarly, evidence that changes in the out-
comes from 2011-2013 are correlated with the interaction of 
area uninsured rate with Medicaid expansion status (ie, β1  or 
β2  are significant) would suggest a violation of the second 
assumption.
Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the implied effects of the ACA at the 
average pretreatment uninsured rate (equal to 20.6%) based 
on coefficient estimates from the regressions described by 
Equations 1 and 2 for each outcome. The top panel shows the 
results from the DDD analysis that pools the 3-year postre-
form period together, while the bottom panel presents results 
from the event-study specification where each postreform 
year is included separately. Indicators of statistical signifi-
cance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level are also shown. In each 
case, we report 3 sets of implied effects: the ACA without the 
Medicaid expansion, the Medicaid expansion alone, and the 
“full” ACA which includes the Medicaid expansion (and is 
thus the sum of the first 2 implied effects).
Effects on Access to Care
Table 2 focuses on the outcomes related to access. The top 
panel shows that the ACA led to statistically significant 
increases in access to care at the sample mean pretreatment 
uninsured rate in both Medicaid expansion and nonexpan-
sion states in the postreform period. States that participated 
in the Medicaid expansion (and therefore received the 
national components of the ACA as well as the Medicaid 
expansion) saw a 9.5 percentage point increase in insurance 
coverage, a 3.4 percentage point increase in reporting having 
a primary care doctor, and a 5.6 percentage point reduction in 
the probability of reporting cost being a barrier to receiving 
care. Results were somewhat smaller in states that refused 
the Medicaid expansion (6.2 percentage point increase in 
insurance coverage, 3.1 percentage point increase in report-
ing having a primary care doctor, and 3.6 percentage point 
reduction in reporting cost being a barrier to receiving care). 
The difference between these 2 sets of estimates (a 3.3 per-
centage point increase in insurance coverage, no statistically 
significant change in reporting having a primary care doctor, 
and a 1.5 percentage point reduction in the probability of 
reporting cost being a barrier to receiving care) is also 
reported in Table 2 and is due to the Medicaid expansion 
alone. These results are generally larger than those found by 
a recent article using BRFSS data and the same identification 
strategy but only 2 posttreatment years, suggesting larger 
effects in 2016 than in 2014 and 2015.18
To investigate how the effects changed over time more 
directly, we next discuss the implied effects from the event-
study specification. The results show that the gains in access 
to care, for the majority of measures, increased over time 
both in Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states. The 
first 3 rows of the bottom panel of Table 2 show the results 
for nonexpansion states. The ACA led to an increase in the 
probability of having insurance coverage of 3.6 percentage 
points in 2014, 5.9 percentage points in 2015, and 8.3 per-
centage points in 2016 at the sample mean pretreatment 
uninsured rate. While we also see statistically significant 
increases in reports of having a primary care doctor in all 3 
posttreatment years, the growth of the impact over time (2.0 
percentage points in 2014 to 2.7 percentage points in 2016) 
is more modest than that for insurance coverage and is statis-
tically insignificant. We observe a growing reduction over 
time in the probability of reporting cost being a barrier to 
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receiving care, as the 2.7 percentage point reduction in 2014 
rises to 4.1 percentage points in 2016.
The last 3 rows of Table 2 report the event-study results 
for states that participated in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. 
While the increases in access are larger than the correspond-
ing increases in nonexpansion states, we again observe the 
same general patterns of the gains strengthening over time. 
The effect on the probability of having coverage rises every 
year, from 6.5 percentage points in 2014 to 9.7 percentage 
points in 2015 and 11.8 percentage points in 2016 at the aver-
age pretreatment uninsured rate. Based on the sample means 
for the outcomes reported in Table 1, these results imply that 
the full ACA—including the Medicaid expansion—reduced 
the uninsured rate by 8.2% in 2014, by 12.3% in 2015, and 
by 14.9% in 2016. Next, while we see statistically significant 
increases in reports of having a primary care doctor in each 
year in expansion states, the change between 2014 and 2016, 
while sizable, is not statistically significant. The reduction in 
cost being a barrier to receiving care strengthens over time, 
from 3.0 percentage points in 2014 to 5.1 percentage points 
in 2015 and 6.0 percentage points in 2016. The difference 
between these 2 sets of results, representing the effect of the 
Medicaid expansion alone, is reported in the middle 3 rows 
of the bottom panel of Table 2.
Effects on Self-Assessed Health
Table 3 focuses on the outcomes related to self-assessed 
health. We find evidence of gains in some aspects of self-
assessed health, which contrasts a recent article’s null results 
using BRFSS data and the same econometric strategy but 
only 2 years of posttreatment data.18 The top panel shows 
that, in the combined 3-year posttreatment period, residents 
of Medicaid expansion states (receiving both the national 
components of the ACA and the Medicaid expansion) saw a 
statistically significant 1.3 percentage point increase in the 
probability of reporting excellent health at the average pre-
treatment uninsured rate and a reduction in days not in good 
mental health of 0.2 per month. In nonexpansion states 
(receiving only the national components of the ACA), we 
Table 2. Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate on Health Care Access.
Insurance 
coverage
Primary care 
doctor Cost barrier
Difference-in-difference-in-differences model
 ACA without Medicaid expansion 2014-2016 0.062***
(0.006)
0.031***
(0.007)
−0.033***
(0.006)
 Medicaid expansion 2014-2016 0.033***
(0.009)
0.002
(0.011)
−0.015*
(0.007)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 2014-2016 0.095***
(0.012)
0.034***
(0.009)
−0.048***
(0.008)
Event-study model
 ACA without Medicaid expansion in 2014 0.036***
(0.010)
0.020**
(0.009)
−0.027**
(0.012)
 ACA without Medicaid expansion in 2015 0.059***
(0.014)
0.023
(0.024)
−0.020**
(0.010)
 ACA without Medicaid expansion in 2016 0.083***
(0.009)††
0.027***
(0.009)
−0.041**
(0.015)†
 Medicaid expansion in 2014 0.028*
(0.013)
0.008
(0.015)
−0.004
(0.011)
 Medicaid expansion in 2015 0.038*
(0.017)
0.024
(0.024)
−0.031**
(0.009)
 Medicaid expansion in 2016 0.035**
(0.013)
0.023
(0.012)
−0.019†
(0.013)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) in 2014 0.065***
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.014)
−0.030***
(0.007)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) in 2015 0.097***
(0.013)
0.047**
(0.014)
−0.051***
(0.011)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) in 2016 0.118***
(0.015)†††
0.050***
(0.011)
−0.060***
(0.012)††
P value from F test that all pretreatment coefficients = 0 .915 .365 .787
Sample size 1,575,395 1,574,392 1,575,648
Note. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. ACA = Affordable Care Act. *** indicates statistically 
significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System sampling weights are used. All regressions include state × 
location type and year × location type fixed effects as well as the controls. In addition, we denote statistically significantly different effect in 2016 relative 
to 2014 by ††† at 1% level; †† at 5% level; † at 10% level.
Courtemanche et al 7
find 2 statistically significant results—a 1.6 percentage point 
increase in reporting excellent health and a 1.2 percentage 
point increase in reporting very good or excellent health—as 
well as an impact on mental health that is almost as large as 
that for expansion states, though not significant. We also find 
that the Medicaid expansion alone led to an increase in days 
with health-related limitations. Together, these results sug-
gest that gains in self-assessed health from the ACA are 
mostly or entirely attributable to the expansion of private 
insurance among low-to-middle-income individuals rather 
than the Medicaid expansion among those with low incomes.
Appendix Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence that the 
gains in self-assessed health in nonexpansion states are the 
result of both increases among those in states with prereform 
uninsured rates above the median and reductions in states 
with prereform uninsured rates below the median. Also dis-
cussed further in the appendix is an alternative specification 
to evaluate our finding that the Medicaid expansion is not a 
driver of the increase in self-assessed health: a DD analysis 
of the effect of the Medicaid expansion among a sample of 
low-income individuals (<$25 000 per year). Consistent 
with our DDD results, the DD results show that the Medicaid 
expansion led to improvements in access to care but not self-
assessed health.
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents the event-study 
results for the self-assessed health outcomes, which clearly 
illustrate the importance of the third posttreatment year. In 
nonexpansion states, we see large and statistically significant 
gains in 2016 in reports of good or better health (1.5 percent-
age point increase), very good or excellent health (4.3 per-
centage point increase), and excellent health (3.5 percentage 
point increase). These results suggest gains across the entire 
distribution of self-assessed health. We also see a statistically 
significant reduction in days with health-related limitations in 
2016. The only result in these outcomes that was significant 
in 2014 or 2015 was a 2 percentage point increase in very 
good/excellent health in 2014—and the size of this effect 
more than doubled in 2016. In states that fully implemented 
Table 3. Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate on Self-Assessed Health.
Good or 
better health
Very good or 
excellent health
Excellent 
health
Days not in good 
physical health
Days not in good 
mental health
Days with health-
related limitations
Difference-in-difference-in-differences model
 ACA without Medicaid 
expansion 2014-2016
−0.003
(0.005)
0.012*
(0.005)
0.016*
(0.006)
−0.219
(0.115)
−0.177
(0.144)
−0.195
(0.142)
 Medicaid expansion 2014-
2016
0.001
(0.006)
−0.009
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.007)
0.151
(0.108)
−0.041
(0.127)
0.299*
(0.142)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid 
expansion) 2014-2016
−0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.009)
0.013*
(0.006)
−0.067
(0.116)
−0.218*
(0.109)
0.104
(0.136)
Event-study model
 ACA without Medicaid 
expansion in 2014
−0.004
(0.008)
0.020***
(0.007)
0.014
(0.009)
−0.100
(0.247)
−0.131
(0.170)
−0.044
(0.133)
 ACA without Medicaid 
expansion in 2015
0.001
(0.007)
0.020
(0.016)
0.009
(0.009)
0.116
(0.189)
0.269
(0.142)
0.123
(0.157)
 ACA without Medicaid 
expansion in 2016
0.015***
(0.005)††
0.043***
(0.010)†††
0.035***
(0.007)
−0.412
(0.286)††
−0.216
(0.177)
−0.207**
(0.094)
 Medicaid expansion in 2014 0.002
(0.008)
−0.018
(0.012)
−0.006
(0.011)
0.146
(0.258)
−0.160
(0.153)
0.117
(0.200)
 Medicaid expansion in 2015 −0.006
(0.011)
−0.015
(0.019)
0.009
(0.011)
−0.056
(0.214)
−0.132
(0.211)
0.132
(0.175)
 Medicaid expansion in 2016 −0.025**
(0.008)†††
−0.032*
(0.015)
−0.008
(0.010)
0.499
(0.308)†
0.047
(0.181)
0.423*
(0.161)†
 Full ACA (with Medicaid 
expansion) in 2014
−0.003
(0.008)
0.002
(0.011)
0.008
(0.011)
0.046
(0.165)
−0.292**
(0.133)
0.073
(0.192)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid 
expansion) in 2015
−0.005
(0.008)
0.005
(0.013)
0.019**
(0.009)
0.061
(0.166)
0.137
(0.150)
0.255
(0.170)
 Full ACA (with Medicaid 
expansion) in 2016
−0.010
(0.008)
0.012
(0.015)
0.027**
(0.011)†
0.087
(0.177)
−0.169
(0.0158)
0.216
(0.150)
P value from F test that all 
pretreatment coefficients = 0
.367 .152 .039 .256 .334 .293
Sample size 1,574,915 1,574,915 1,574,915 1,560,340 1,561,612 1,568,250
Note. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. ACA = Affordable Care Act. *** indicates statistically 
significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System sampling weights are used. All regressions include state × 
location type and year × location type fixed effects as well as the controls. In addition, we denote statistically significantly different effect in 2016 relative 
to 2014 by ††† at 1% level; †† at 5% level; † at 10% level.
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the ACA, we see statistically significant increases in reports 
of excellent health in 2015 (1.9 percentage point increase) 
and 2016 (2.7 percentage point increase). Based on the sam-
ple means for the outcomes reported in Table 1, these results 
imply that the full ACA increased the probability of reporting 
excellent health by 9.3% in 2015 and by 13.2% in 2016. As 
with the DDD results discussed previously, the fact that the 
event-study model reveals clearer gains in self-assessed 
health in non-Medicaid-expansion states than in expansion 
states suggests that health gains from the ACA are driven by 
the private expansion rather than the Medicaid expansion. 
This interpretation is also supported by our estimates of the 
impact of the Medicaid expansion alone, reported in the mid-
dle 3 lines of the bottom panel of Table 3, which suggest that 
the Medicaid expansion led to a 2.5 percentage point reduc-
tion in reporting good or better health and an increase in days 
with health-related limitations in 2016.
Given the large number of null hypotheses tested in Tables 
2 and 3, we might expect a few significant results to emerge 
merely by chance. Specifically, with 9 outcomes and 12 
reported results for each, there are a total of 108 hypothesis 
tests, meaning that 5 to 6 spurious results would be expected 
to emerge using a 5% significance level. However, we 
observe 45 significant results across the 2 tables, strongly 
suggesting that chance alone cannot explain our findings.
Testing Identifying Assumptions of the Model
As discussed previously, another benefit of our event-
study analysis is that it enables tests of the model’s identi-
fying assumptions by asking whether the coefficients 
on the interactions of UNINSUREDas  and 
UNINSURED MEDICAIDas st×  with the year 2011 and 
2012 dummies are statistically significant relative to the 
base year of 2013. We found only 1 placebo test failure out 
of 36 (4 for each of the 9 outcomes) using a 5% signifi-
cance level. One out of 36 is 2.8%, which is slightly below 
the number of rejections that we would expect to obtain by 
chance. In addition, for each regression we conducted an F 
test of the null hypothesis that all of the interactions for the 
2011 and 2012 year dummies are equal to 0. The results are 
reported at the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 and are statisti-
cally insignificant in all but 1 of the 9 regressions. The full 
event-study results are presented graphically in Figures 3 
to 6 in the appendix. We also include in our appendix 
results from a large number of specification checks that 
strongly support our findings for the health care access 
outcomes in Table 2 and usually support those for the self-
assessed health outcomes in Table 3. Individual exceptions 
are noted in our discussion of the appendix tables.
Discussion
Our primary contribution is to show that the ACA’s impact on 
access to care continued to grow in 2016, while improvements 
in self-assessed health emerged that were not evident using the 
same research design and data source but only 2 years of post-
treatment data. Such delayed effects could be attributable to 
several factors, such as the gradual nature of the coverage 
expansions, increasing enrollee familiarity with their new 
insurance coverage, or an extended amount of medical treat-
ment being necessary to make progress on certain chronic 
conditions.
A particularly interesting aspect of our results is that the 
ACA’s effect on self-assessed health appears to operate 
entirely through the nationwide portions of the law rather 
than the Medicaid expansion. Medicaid’s relatively low reim-
bursement rates can lead to difficulty finding a primary care 
provider, which could limit its effect on health relative to 
Marketplace plans.36 Accordingly, we find that the ACA’s 
impacts on having a primary care doctor and foregone care 
due to cost are almost completely attributable to the national 
portion of the law rather than the Medicaid expansion. 
Working in the other direction is the fact that private insur-
ance plans generally have higher deductibles and copayments 
than Medicaid, which might limit access for Marketplace par-
ticipants. However, a very large percentage of Marketplace 
enrollees (72%) were potentially eligible for cost-sharing 
reductions that reduce the difference in out-of-pocket costs 
between Medicaid and Marketplace enrollees.37
Differences in the treated populations could provide another 
explanation for our finding that the ACA’s private expansion, 
rather than its Medicaid expansion, appears to account for the 
health gains. The ACA specified Medicaid as the mechanism to 
insure low-income individuals and Marketplaces as the mecha-
nism to insure those closer to the middle of the income distribu-
tion. If higher socioeconomic–status individuals are more 
efficient producers of health—as suggested by one article’s 
finding of differences across the income distribution in the 
amount of health care utilized after gaining coverage—this 
could explain the relative effectiveness of the private expan-
sion.38 Further evidence comes from a recent study showing 
that the Marketplace population is more health literate than 
samples from prior insurance expansions.37
With all that said, it is important to note that our finding of 
minimal improvements in primary care access and self-
assessed health from the Medicaid expansion contrasts the 
large gains in both access and self-assessed health that were 
observed after the randomized Oregon Medicaid expan-
sion.22 On the contrary, both our results focusing on the num-
ber of days not in good mental health and those focusing on 
depression in the Oregon study suggest the potential for cov-
erage expansions to improve mental health.22,39 This mixed 
concordance suggests the potential for state-to-state varia-
tion in Medicaid’s impacts.
Our findings also highlight the need for additional 
research that examines how other relevant outcomes associ-
ated with the ACA changed in 2016, such as sources of cov-
erage, health care utilization, objective health measures, 
labor market outcomes, and financial well-being.40 To the 
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extent to which improved program administration contrib-
uted to the increases in self-assessed health, it will be impor-
tant to analyze the impact of the more recent administrative 
changes involving the ACA. These include changes in the 
amount of funding allocated toward outreach, the timing 
associated with open enrollment, and the hours of operation 
for the Marketplace website.
Conclusion
Using data from the BRFSS, this article examines the causal 
impacts of the ACA on health-related outcomes after 3 years. 
We estimate triple-difference models that exploit variation in 
treatment intensity from local area pre-ACA uninsured rates 
and state participation in the Medicaid expansion. The inclu-
sion of a third postreform year leads to 2 important insights. 
First, gains in health insurance coverage and access to care 
from the ACA continued to increase in the third year. Second, 
an improvement in self-assessed health emerged in the third 
year, with the effect being largely driven by the non-Medic-
aid components of the ACA.
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